analytical fields, and moving in certain directions in the latter. An observer might calculate with less margin of error the probable outcome of such negotiations [Wnght, 1955, p. 566 ].
This quotation from Quincy Wright illustrates his concern for the policy relevance of data on world politics. Wright's dynamic mapping of international relations via his field approach assumes predictive models and quantitative data to be valid for policy purposes. Policy forecasts, moreover, would provide a stringent test of the validity of models and of the reliability of data.
It is precisely the conjunction of his concern with theory-building, quantitative data, and policy relevance that makes Wright' do it, but mainly because he synthesized the three tasks so well that the singularity of the task is now commonplace.
To be sure, as noted below, Wright did not achieve this synthesis by gathering data to explore his field approach (1955), nor did he achieve it by deriving a general theory of war from his monumental collection of empirical materials on the subject (1942) . Yet (Lamborn, 1971 (Rummel, 1965, p. 97) .
Similarly, Rummel' (1) abstractness-concreteness ; (2) subjectivity-objectivity; (3) situation orientation-self orientation; (4) restrictiveness-liberality ; (5) manipulation-contemplation ; (6) negation-affirmation.
Generally, Wright assumes that the capability and value fields have an additive, i.e., independent, effect on war.5 Figure 1 (Rosenau, 1966) (Holsti, 1962 ; also cf.
Holsti, Brody, and North, 1964; Holsti, 1969 alternative strategies (cf. Jervis, 1969, and North, 1969, 
